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Abstract
According to a bodily view of pain, pains are objects which are located in body 
parts. This bodily view is supported by the locative locutions for pain in English, 
such as that “I have a pain in my back.” Recently, Liu and Klein (Analysis, 80(2), 
262–272, 2020) carry out a cross-linguistic analysis, and they claim that (1) Man-
darin has no locative locutions for pain and (2) the absence of locative locutions 
for pain puts the bodily view at risk. This paper rejects both claims. Regarding the 
philosophical claim, I argue that a language without locative locutions for pain only 
poses a limited challenge to the bodily view. Regarding the empirical claim, I iden-
tify the possible factors which might have misled Liu and Klein about the locative 
locutions for pain in Mandarin, and argue that Mandarin has a wide range of loca-
tive locutions for pain by conducting a corpus analysis. I conclude that compared to 
English, Mandarin lends no less, if not more, support to the bodily view of pain.
Keywords Pain · Bodily theories of pain · Cross-linguistic analysis · Mandarin · 
Corpus analysis
1  The Bodily View of Pain and Locative Locutions for Pain
Suppose you are suffering from a paper cut on the fingertip. It is beyond dispute that 
there is tissue damage in your fingertip, and you are experiencing pain. But there are 
significant disagreements among philosophers about the nature of pain. One disa-
greement is concerned with the question of whether pains are something mental or 
something bodily. According to the mental state view, pains are mental states which 
are “in the head if they are anywhere” (Aydede, 2019). Though there are further 
debates on the nature of pain qua mental state: for example, some argue that pains 
are conscious mental states (e.g., Dennett, 1986; Hill, 2009; Kripke, 1980; Reid, 
1785/2011) and others argue that pains can be unconscious mental states (e.g., Arm-
strong, 1963; Dretske, 2006; Lycan, 1995), they all deny that pains are something 
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which inhabits body parts. By contrast, bodily theorists argue that pains are states 
of body parts, or objects which are located in body parts (Cornman, 1977; Cutter, 
2017; Graham & Stephens, 1985; Massin, 2017; Newton, 1989; Reuter et al., 2019; 
Stumpf, 1928; Sytsma & Reuter, 2017). This paper focuses on the bodily view that 
pains are objects which are located in body parts. According to Aydede (2019), 
many pain locutions in English lend support to this bodily view. Consider the fol-
lowing two sentences:
(a) I have a coin in my left pocket.
(b) I have a sharp pain in my left thigh.
On the face of it, (b) shares the same surface grammatical structure with (a). And 
this suggests that like the coin which is an object located in my left pocket, the sharp 
pain is, or is conceived of as, an object which is located in my left thigh. Let us call 
it the surface-grammar argument for the bodily view of pain (for a critique of this 
argument, see Aydede, 2019).
In a recent paper, Liu and Klein (2020) carry out a cross-linguistic analysis, and 
they claim that (1) pain locutions like (b), which they call locative locutions, “are 
impermissible in Mandarin” (p. 265) and (2) this puts the bodily view of pain “at 
risk” (pp. 269–270). Before discussing the empirical question of whether Mandarin 
has locative locutions for pain, it is worth considering the philosophical question of 
to what extent a language without locative locutions for pain would be a problem for 
the bodily view of pain.
To answer this question, it would be helpful to examine the question of to what 
extent the locative locutions for pain in English are a problem for the mental state 
view of pain. Tye (1984), for example, explicitly acknowledges that the locative 
locutions for pain in English pose a challenge to the adverbial theory of pain. In 
response, he rejects the surface-grammar argument, and argues that the locative 
locutions should not be understood at face value. One reason in favour of Tye’s 
response is that the locative locutions, if understood at face value, would generate 
certain problems. For instance, Block (1983, p. 517) asks us to consider the follow-
ing inference:
The pain is in my fingertip.
The fingertip is in my mouth.
Therefore, the pain is in my mouth.
Block argues that the inference is invalid, despite the apparent validity with 
respect to its surface structure.1 He suggests that we should not take such kind of 
pain locutions at face value. More specifically, Block argues that the meaning of 
the preposition “in” for pains qua mental particulars differs from the meaning of 
“in” for physical objects. The proposal that such kind of pain locutions should not 
be understood at face value is shared among many philosophers, though they may 
disagree on how exactly we should understand such kind of pain locutions (Noord-
hof, 2001, 2002, 2006; Olivier, 2006; Tye, 1995, 2002, 2005). This suggests that a 
1 By contrast, Reuter et al. (2019) argue that the inference is “not invalid”.
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certain form of surface grammar itself does not suffice to put a philosophical view 
of pain at risk.
Moreover, if we take mental state views and bodily views as metaphysical theses, 
then a certain form of surface grammar itself can hardly provide a knockdown argu-
ment against a metaphysical thesis even if we accept that it may pose some chal-
lenge (see also, Bain, 2007). Admittedly, for some bodily theorists, the bodily view 
of pain is not (only) a metaphysical thesis, but a folk-psychological thesis about peo-
ple’s actual concept of pain (Reuter, 2011; Reuter et  al., 2014; Reuter & Sytsma, 
2020; Sytsma, 2010; Sytsma & Reuter, 2017). Would the existence of a language 
without locative locutions for pain be a grave problem for the bodily view as a folk-
psychological thesis? At first glance, the existence of such a language might seem at 
odds with the bodily view that speakers of that language conceive of pains as objects 
which are located in body parts. In this sense, such a language poses a greater chal-
lenge to the bodily view as a folk-psychological thesis, as opposed to the bodily 
view as a metaphysical thesis. But I think bodily theorists have, at least, several pos-
sible responses at hand.
Bodily theorists may argue that speakers of different languages do have different 
concepts of pain. This response might not seem satisfactory for many philosophers 
who hold that there is an intimate relationship between concepts and experiences 
(e.g., McDowell, 1996). They may argue that if speakers of different languages have 
different concepts of pain, then they would have different experiences of pain. This 
is, however, at odds with the intuitive idea “that the experience of physical pain 
itself is a cross-cultural universal” (Liu & Klein, 2020, p. 269). While bodily theo-
rists could also reject the idea that the experience of pain is a cross-cultural univer-
sal, I think they have a different, and perhaps better, response which explains why 
the existence of a language without locative locutions for pain is not a grave problem 
for their folk-psychological thesis.
Bodily theorists may emphasise that bodily views are not solely built on the 
basis of the surface-grammar argument, but are mainly supported by carefully 
designed empirical studies, including questionnaire studies and corpus analysis (for 
a review, see Sytsma & Reuter, 2017). For example, a group of empirical studies 
aims to find out whether ordinary people think that pain hallucinations are pos-
sible (Reuter et al., 2014). The idea is that if the mental state view of pain is true 
that ordinary people conceive of pains as mental states, then they would think that 
pain hallucinations are impossible. This is because, according to the mental state 
view, “any situation that a person cannot discriminate from a situation in which he 
himself has a pain counts as a situation in which he has pain.” (Putnam, 1963/2014, 
p. 218) The result of these studies, however, shows that “almost two-thirds of the 
participants … endorsed the possibility of pain hallucinations” (Reuter et al., 2014, 
p. 87). According to Reuter et al. (2014), this result supports the view that pains are 
bodily states, as opposed to mental states. It is important to note that the result sup-
ports not only the view that pains are bodily states but also the view that pains are 
objects located in body parts, which is the bodily view Liu and Klein (2020) take 
issue with.
Can the existence of a language with locative locutions for pain pose a 
challenge to these empirical studies? It might be if there is an argument that 
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locative locutions for pain are important variables in these studies, the absence 
of which would change the result. Since not only is such an argument absent 
in Liu and Klein’s paper but it is far from clear that such an argument is plau-
sible, the existence of a language without locative locutions for pain does not 
seem to be a grave problem for the bodily view of pain as a folk-psychological 
thesis.2
In this section, I have argued that a language without locative locutions for 
pain can hardly pose an enormous challenge to the bodily view of pain as a met-
aphysical thesis or a folk-psychological thesis. I acknowledge that such a lan-
guage, if exists, would be a challenge for a bodily theorist who intends to build 
her theory on the basis of the surface-grammar argument. However, for it to be a 
real, rather than an imaginative, challenge, one needs to demonstrate that such a 
language actually exists. Liu and Klein (2020) argue that Mandarin is such a lan-
guage. I disagree. In the next section, I shall argue that Mandarin in fact contains 
a wide range of locative locutions for pain, which lend support to the bodily view 
of pain.
2  Locative Locutions for Pain in Mandarin
Mandarin is the largest spoken language in the world by the number of native speak-
ers (Wang & Sun, 2015, p. 578). Liu and Klein (2020, pp. 264–265) claim that “[t]
he locative form for reporting on physical pain in English … [is] impermissible 
in Mandarin”. If the idea behind the surface-grammar argument is correct that the 
surface grammar of pain locutions in a particular language reflects the concept of 
pain in that language, then Liu and Klein’s claim seems to suggest that few Man-
darin speakers conceive of pains as objects which are located in body parts. At first 
blush, this suggestion about Mandarin speakers’ concept of pain seems implausi-
ble, because at the very least there is no evidence that the bodily view of pain is 
something alien to Mandarin speakers. The implausibility of this suggestion in turn 
indicates that there is something wrong with Liu and Klein’s claim about the pain 
locutions in Mandarin.
Liu and Klein acknowledge that Mandarin has predictive locutions for pain, such 
as that “my back hurts” and that “my back is painful”. By contrast, what they call 
the locative form of pain locutions has four distinctive features as follows:
(1) It uses a prepositional phrase; most importantly, it can take the preposition ‘in’ 
as in ‘in my back’ – the use of the preposition ‘in’ signals the body part where 
pain is located;
(2) Pain is countable – one can say ‘a pain’;
(3) It permits an existential construction as in ‘THERE IS a pain’.
2 If speakers of different languages do have a similar concept of pain, then it is reasonable to expect that 




(4) It permits a possessive construction as in ‘I HAVE a pain in my back’. (ibid., p. 
265)3
According to Liu and Klein, the locative locutions “at least on the surface, would 
commit pains to being the objects of sensation, rather than just properties of objects 
like body parts.” (ibid., p. 262) For the sake of the argument, I shall accept this point. 
The controversial claim proposed by Liu and Klein is that none of these features is 
permissible in Mandarin and hence Mandarin has no locative locutions for pain. 
Before discussing the detail of these four features, I’m not convinced that we should 
unreflectively take the grammatical features of English as the criteria to make a judge-
ment about Mandarin. For example, one grammatical feature of English locutions for 
past actions is that past tense verbs should be used. By contrast, in Mandarin the same 
verb is used to refer to past and present actions. It would be absurd, however, to con-
clude that Mandarin has no locutions for past actions just because we cannot find any 
past tense verbs in Mandarin. Of course, it does not mean that we cannot use any fea-
tures of English to make a judgement about Mandarin. But it is reasonable to say that 
we should be extra cautious about what an apparent difference between English and 
Mandarin can tell us. In the following, I shall argue that Liu and Klein’s claim may be 
misguided by some apparent differences between English and Mandarin.
The first feature of the locative form of pain locutions in English is “the use of the 
preposition ‘in’ [which] signals the body part where pain is located” (Liu & Klein, 
2020, p. 265). Is a similar kind of pain locutions permissible in Mandarin?
Liu and Klein acknowledge that in Mandarin the postposition lǐ is “similar in 
meaning to the English prepositions ‘in’ or ‘inside’, in specifying the location of con-
crete physical object”. But they claim that “lǐ is not usually used in a postpositional 
phrase in Mandarin to signal the body part affected by physical pain.” (ibid., p. 266).
Liu and Klein did not provide much evidence to support this claim. It seems that 
their claim was based on the intuition of a few Mandarin speakers (ibid., footnote 
8). To verify Liu and Klein’s claim, it would not be enough to appeal to a few more 
Mandarin speakers’ intuition, no matter whether it may confirm or disconfirm Liu 
and Klein’s claim. Instead, to get a comprehensive picture of Mandarin pain locu-
tions, it is better to conduct a corpus analysis, which will also help us verify whether 
certain kinds of pain locutions are in fact present in Mandarin (for a discussion of 
the significance of corpus analysis for philosophy, see Bluhm, 2016). There are quite 
a few existing Chinese corpora. The corpus I shall use is called the Beijing Lan-
guage and Culture University Corpus Center Corpus, or the BCC Corpus for short 
(Xun et al., 2016). It is available online for free (http:// bcc. blcu. edu. cn).
3 It is also questionable to what extent and in what sense these four features are universally present in 
the locative locutions for pain in English. For example, according to Practical English Usage, “tooth-
ache, earache, stomach ache and backache are usually uncountable in British English. In American 
English, these words are generally countable if they refer to particular attacks of pain.”(Swan, 2016, 
Sect. 11.119.7) Since the locutions for these pains in British English do not have Feature (2). If the lack 
of Feature (2) puts the bodily view of pain at risk, as Liu and Klein seem to suggest, then they would 
have to say that British English poses, while American English doesn’t pose, a challenge to the bodily 
view, and that British English speakers conceive of pain in a different way from American English speak-




Mandarin has three words whose meaning is similar to that of the English word 
pain: tòng, téng, and téngtòng. If Liu and Klein’s (2020, p. 266) claim is true that 
“lǐ is not usually used in a postpositional phrase in Mandarin to signal the body part 
affected by physical pain”, then we would not find Mandarin pain locutions with the 
following structure:
Noun phrase + lǐ + tòng/téng/téngtòng
However, when the phrase lǐ téng (里疼 “in pain”) is searched in the BCC Cor-









These two examples, I think, suffice to illustrate that, contra Liu and Klein’s 
claim, in Mandarin lǐ can be used in a postpositional phrase to signal the body parts 
affected by physical pain.5
Moreover, not only does Mandarin have a postposition lǐ, which is similar to the 
English preposition in, it also has, I shall note, at least two prepositions yú (于) and 
zài (在), which can be used to report on the location of pain in body parts. When the 
phrase tòng yú (痛于 “pain in”) and tòng zài (痛在 “pain in”) are searched in the 
BCC Corpus, the result includes the following examples:
痛于骨髓
tòng yú gǔsuǐ
pain in bone marrow




“Where is the pain?”
The fact that Mandarin has both the postposition lǐ and the prepositions yú and 
zài to signal the body parts affected by physical pain suggests that regarding the first 
feature, Mandarin lends no less, if not more, support to the bodily view of pain.
The second feature of the locative form of pain locutions in English is that “[p]ain 
is countable – one can say ‘a pain’ (Liu & Klein, 2020, p. 265). Is a similar kind of 
pain locutions permissible in Mandarin?
5 Some of the results generated by the BCC Corpus are not suitable counterexamples. But for the pur-
poses of this paper, the abundance of counterexamples itself suffices to reject Liu and Klein’s claim that 
locative locutions for pains “are impermissible in Mandarin” (Liu & Klein, 2020, p. 265).
4 CL: classifier; LIG: marker of ligature in dependency relations; DEM: demonstrative.
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Liu and Klein (2020, p. 266) claim that “in Mandarin … one cannot say ‘a pain’ 
… [because] [i]n Mandarin, sensations in general are not countable”.
I agree that one cannot say “a pain” in Mandarin. But the reason is not that pain 
or sensations in general are not countable in Mandarin. Rather, it is because unlike 
English, Mandarin does not have articles: a, an, and the. Obviously, we cannot use 
Mandarin’s lack of articles and hence the lack of the phrase “a pain” to support the 
claim that pain is not countable in Mandarin. Otherwise, it might imply a silly claim 
that nothing in Mandarin is countable.
To check whether pain is countable in Mandarin, instead of asking whether “a 
pain” is permissible, we should ask whether “one pain”, “two pains” and the like are 
permissible. Again, we shall rely on corpus analysis. When the phrase yī tòng (一痛 






zuǒ jiān yī tòng
Left shoulder one pain
“one pain in the left shoulder”
一痛再痛
yī tòng zài tòng
One pain again pain
“one pain after another”
When we replace the Chinese word yī (一 “one”) with a bigger number, the BCC 
Corpus generates more examples, such as:
三病二痛
sān bìng èr tòng
three illness two pain
“three illnesses and two pains”
Interestingly, in Mandarin the meaning of the phrase sān bìng èr tòng is not that 
the subject suffers from literally three illnesses and two pains, but that the sub-
ject suffers from many illnesses and many pains. Phrases with a similar meaning 
include:
三病四痛
sān bìng sì tòng
three illness four pain
“three illnesses and four pains”
七病八痛
qī bìng bā tòng
seven illness eight pain




shí bìng jiǔ tòng
ten illness nine pain
“ten illnesses and nine pains”





They write that “[o]ne cannot say” yīgè téngtòng in Mandarin (ibid.). I agree 
that yīgè téngtòng is not an idiomatic Mandarin locution. But this doesn’t entail 
that Mandarin speakers cannot use the “one:CL” structure to report on physical 
pain. Even though yīgè téngtòng is not idiomatic, we shall check whether Manda-
rin speakers use yīgè téng and yīgè tòng. When the latter phrases are searched in 
the BCC Corpus, it generates 223 and 659 results, respectively, including:
这叫一个疼
zhè jiào yīgè téng
this is.called one:CL pain
“This is called a pain.”
These examples suffice to illustrate that, contra Liu and Klein’s claim, pain can 
be countable in Mandarin.
The third feature of the locative form of pain locutions in English is that “[i]
t permits an existential construction as in ‘THERE IS a pain’.” The fourth feature 
is that “[i]t permits a possessive construction as in ‘I HAVE a pain in my back’.” 
(ibid., p. 265).
Liu and Klein acknowledge that “Mandarin has an equivalent to ‘there is’ in 
English (i.e. yǒu)” (ibid., p. 266). But it is crucial to notice that the Mandarin 
word yǒu can be used in the existential sense as well as the possessive sense. 
We cannot rely on the surface grammar of a Mandarin locution with the word 
yǒu to judge whether it is used in the existential sense or the possessive sense. 
For example, in the locution that huǒxīng yǒu shuǐ (火星有水 “There is water 
on Mars”) it is an existential use of yǒu, while in the locution that wǒ yǒu qián 
(我有钱 “I have money”) it is a possessive use of yǒu. This means that the sur-
face grammar of a Mandarin locution with the word yǒu cannot tell us whether 
it meets the requirement of the third feature or the fourth feature. That being 
said, we can still ask whether Mandarin has locutions for pain using the word 








Indeed, this is not an idiomatic Mandarin locution for physical pain. But it does 
not entail that Mandarin has no locutions for physical pain with the word yǒu. Once 
again, we shall use a corpus analysis to find out the answer. When the phrase yǒu 
tòng (有痛 “have pain”) is searched in the BCC Corpus, it generates 1697 results 
including:
右肾区有痛
yòu shèn qū yǒu tòng
left kidney area there.is pain





It is evident that, contra Liu and Klein’s claim, Mandarin has pain locutions in the 
existential sense, and pain locutions in the possessive sense.
So far, I have argued that Mandarin has pain locutions with all the four features 
of the locative form of pain locutions in English. This suggests that many pain locu-
tions in Mandarin also lend support to the bodily view of pain. Moreover, there are 
many Mandarin pain locutions which take pains not only as objects but as moving 
objects:
痛彻心扉
tòng chè xīn fēi
pain penetrate heart door
“Pain penetrates the door of the heart.”
痛入骨髓
tòng rù gǔ suǐ
pain enter bone marrow
“Pain enters the bone marrow.”6
The Mandarin locutions provided in this section, I think, are more than enough to 
illustrate that Mandarin has a wide range of locative locutions for pain.
It might be argued that some of these Mandarin locutions can be given a non-
locative interpretation: among the examples related to the first feature, zuǐ-lǐ téng 
(“pain in mouth”) can be interpreted as “mouth hurts”, which is a predictive locu-
tion; among the examples related to the second feature, sān bìng èr tòng (“three ill-
nesses and four pains”) can be interpreted as “three kinds of illness and two kinds 
of pain”, which only says that there are different kinds of pain, rather than that pain 
is countable; among the examples related to the third feature, yòu shèn qū yǒu tòng 
(“There is a pain in the left kidney area.”) can be interpreted as “the left kidney area 
hurts”, which is a predictive locution.
6 These two phrases can be used either literally or metaphorically. When they are used literally, it’s 
evident that the pain is conceived of as a moving object. It is worth emphasizing that even when they 




In response, I do not deny that some of the aforementioned Mandarin locutions 
are open to various interpretations, including a non-locative interpretation. But the 
question of how a location can be interpreted is importantly different from the ques-
tion of what the surface grammar of that locution shows. Consider the English loca-
tive locution “There is a pain in my back.” It can arguably be interpreted as “My 
back hurts”, which is a predictive locution. But the possibility of this interpretation 
doesn’t entail that the surface grammar of “There is a pain in my back” cannot lend 
support to the bodily view of pain. Similarly, as far as the surface grammar is con-
cerned, the aforementioned pain locutions in Mandarin are sufficient to show that 
compared to English, Mandarin lends no less, if not more, support to the bodily 
view of pain.
3  Conclusion
Cross-linguistic research can shed invaluable light on philosophical theories (e.g., 
Stich et  al., 2018). The apparent linguistic differences between various languages, 
however, can sometimes be deceptive. Liu and Klein (2020) carried out a cross-lin-
guistic analysis concerning the bodily view of pain that pains are objects which are 
located in body parts. And they claimed that (1) Mandarin has no locative locu-
tions for pain and (2) the absence of locative locutions for pain puts the bodily view 
of pain at risk. In this paper, I first discussed the philosophical claim and argued 
that the significance of the challenge posed by a language without locative locu-
tions for pain is overestimated. Then I discussed the empirical claim. I identified 
the possible factors which might have misled Liu and Klein about Mandarin pain 
locutions, and argued that Mandarin has a wide range of locative locutions for pain, 
which lend support to the bodily view, by conducting a corpus analysis. The use 
of corpus analysis invites further inquiries about, for example, how many kinds of 
pain locutions there are in English and Mandarin, what their frequencies are, and to 
what extent they can support a particular theory of pain. Answers to these questions, 
though beyond the scope of this paper, will help us achieve a deeper understanding 
of the nature of pain.
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